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The Determinants of Environmental Migrants’ Conflict Perception 
 




Migration is likely to be a key factor linking climate change and conflict. However, our 
understanding of the factors behind and consequences of migration is surprisingly limited. We 
take this shortcoming as a motivation for our research and study the relationship between 
environmental migration and conflict at the micro level. In particular, we focus on environmental 
migrants’ conflict perceptions to shed new theoretical and empirical light on this debate. We 
contend that variation in migrants’ conflict perception can be explained by the type of 
environmental event people experienced in their former home, i.e., gradual, long-term or sudden 
onset, short-term environmental changes. We examine and further develop this argument before 
quantitatively analyzing newly collected micro-level data on intra-state migration from five 
developing countries. The results emphasize that migrants who suffered from gradual, long-term 
environmental events in their former homes are more likely to perceive conflict in their new 
location than those having experienced sudden, short-term environmental events. These findings 
are therefore in line with our theoretical argument that environmental migrants who suffer to a 
large degree from environmentally induced grievances, are ultimately more likely to perceive 
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Extreme weather events are frequently seen as important drivers of migration. For example, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change1 contends that migration, i.e., the movement of 
people, is likely to be triggered by climate change in the form of stronger and more frequent 
storms and floods (sudden onset, short-term events) or droughts and rising sea levels (gradual, 
long-term events).2 Warraich, Zaidi, and Patel3 report that several million people were internally 
displaced in the aftermath of the 2010 floods in Pakistan; and globally, it is estimated that an 
average of 22.5 million people have been displaced by climate-related disasters each year 
between 2008 and 2014.4 This number equals about 62,000 individuals a day – with almost all of 
these displacements occurring in developing countries with weak political institutions.5 Some 
studies even predict that climate change could force 200 million people moving permanently or 
temporarily in the future.6  
The influx of environmentally induced migrants into new areas, combined with poor 
socioeconomic conditions and weak political institutions, could lead to higher pressures on 
resources in those receiving areas and, subsequently, induce conflict.7 In this article, we aim at 
shedding light on the conditions under which environmental change could influence conflict by 
																																								 																				
1 IPCC 2014. 
2 See also Foresight Project 2011; Laczko and Aghazarm 2009. 
3 Warraich, Zaidi, and Patel 2011. 
4 Norwegian Refugee Council 2015. 
5 According to Raleigh, Jordan, and Salehyan 2008, environmentally induced migration tends to be internal and 
temporary, although migration across national borders is also possible, albeit less prevalent (see also Hunter, Luna, 
and Norton 2015; Foresight Project 2011). 
6 Myers 2002. These estimates, however, are based on the number of people exposed to increasing climatic risks and 
not on the number of people expected to actually migrate; different levels of vulnerability to climatic change and 
possible adaptation strategies are also not taken into account for these numbers (Gemenne 2011; Foresight Project 
2011). We refer the reader to Piguet 2010 on the methods assessing the weight of the environment in migration 
processes. 
7 Theisen, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Bernauer, Böhmelt, and Koubi 2012; Salehyan 2008; Raleigh, Jordan, and 
Salehyan 2008; Gleditsch, Nordås, and Salehyan 2007; Reuveny 2007; Barnett and Adger 2007; Kahl 2006; Homer-
Dixon 1999; Suhrke 1997. Additional mechanisms could pertain to ethnic tensions if the arrival of newcomers 
upsets an unstable ethnic balance; distrust between sending and receiving areas if the origin location perceives 
maltreatment of migrants; and fault lines that are rooted in pre-existing tensions following socioeconomic issues 
(Reuveny 2007; Goldstone 2001; 2002). Several scholars, however, argue that most of the mechanisms potentially 
turning migration into a cause of conflict in receiving areas are drawn from the refugees’ role in the spread of civil 
war (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). Hence these mechanisms may then not be directly applicable in the case of 
environmental migration (see Gleditsch, Nordås, and Salehyan 2007; Raleigh, Jordan, and Salehyan 2008). 
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examining the migration mechanism at the micro level. While some studies argue that 
individuals impoverished by environmental degradation “become desperate people, all too ready 
to challenge governments,”8 we contend that such claims might be too deterministic in that they 
almost imply that all types of environmental change lead to conflict and that all environmental 
migrants are equally prone to conflictive behavior. Against this background, we develop an 
argument and empirically test how exposure to different types of environmental events in the 
migrants’ former locations shapes their conflict perception in their new place of residence. 
Existing research on the environment-conflict nexus has not provided robust empirical 
evidence so far.9 One reason might be that most empirical studies, although often accounting for 
some contextual factors, model this relationship directly.10 Yet, while environmental/climatic 
conditions per se are unlikely to cause conflict, environmental change could act as a “threat 
multiplier”11 in that it has the potential to exacerbate a wide range of existing and often 
interacting conflict drivers, such as high population growth, resource scarcity, or poor 
governance. Recent studies thus began to analyze the relationship between 
climate/environmental change and conflict in a multi-stage framework in that conditional effects 
and indirect links from the environment and climate change to conflict, mostly via economic 
conditions, food insecurity, and production shocks, are now increasingly being considered.12 
Most of this work finds support for such indirect links, but the migration channel13 through 
																																								 																				
8 Myers 1993, 22 
9 Buhaug 2016; 2015; Salehyan 2014. However, Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel’s (2013) meta-analysis of 60 studies 
reports “strong causal evidence” that climatic events are linked to social conflict at all scales and across all major 
regions of the world (see also Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel 2015a). Their meta-analysis, however, has been criticized 
with respect to sample selection, selection of indicators, and the interpretation of results (Buhaug et al. 2014). 
10 Fjelde and von Uexkull 2012; O’Loughlin et al. 2012; Hsiang, Meng, and Cane 2011; Theisen, Holtermann, and 
Buhaug 2011; Buhaug 2010; Burke et al. 2009. 
11 CAN 2007. 
12 Von Uexkull et al. 2016; Caruso, Petrarca, and Ricciuti 2016; Schleussner et al. 2016; Buhaug et al. 2015; 
Gartzke and Böhmelt 2015; Smith 2014; Maystadt and Ecker 2014; Koubi et al. 2012. 
13 See, e.g., Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel 2015a; Kelley et al. 2015; Reuveny 2007. In general, (internal) migration of 
any cause is frequently seen as a driver of political violence. For instance, Fearon and Laitin 2011 argue that the 
civil war in Sri Lanka was prompted by Sinhalese migration into traditionally Tamil areas. Bove and Böhmelt 2016 
examine the link between migration and terrorism. 
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which changes in the environment could significantly increase the probability of conflict has 
rarely been explored, and existent empirical evidence remains ambiguous.14  
The challenge to quantitatively study how environmentally induced migration affects conflict 
lies in isolating the effect of environmental change on migration. Existing research on the 
environment-conflict relationship mainly focuses on aggregated levels of analysis, e.g., the 
country or region level, but this risks drawing imprecise inferences due to the difficulties in 
separating the effect of environmental change from the many other determinants of conflict. In 
detail, the challenge is to show that it was indeed environmental change in the first place that led 
people to become migrants and, second, that conflict in the host region arose due to the influx of 
exactly these migrants. With this research, we seek to overcome this challenge by focusing on 
the individual, i.e., the micro level, and analyzing newly collected survey data on environmental 
changes, migration and conflict perceptions. We are thereby able to pinpoint whether migration 
decisions are motivated by environmental events and whether this, in turn, influences 
individuals’ conflict perceptions. 
There is substantial variation among environmental migrants in perceiving conflict in their 
new locations, and the question is whether different forms of environmental change contribute to 
this variation.15 We concentrate on two types of environmental change, i.e., gradual, long-term 
vs. sudden, short-term environmental events, and analyze how they affect migrants’ perceptions 
of conflict.16 In doing so, we follow a recent trend in international relations17 that seeks to 
understand and evaluate the micro foundations of existing macro-level results. Focusing on the 
micro level allows us to carefully identify the different steps establishing the presumed causal 
																																								 																				
14 Bernauer, Böhmelt, and Koubi 2012; Salehyan 2008. 
15 While we are aware that migrants are often seen as a threat to receiving societies and, hence, they are likely to 
encounter constant economic and social obstacles (Sedikides et al. 2009) that may exacerbate their conflict 
perceptions, we do not examine variation between migrants and the local population because of data limitations. 
16 To measure gradual, long-term vs. sudden, short-term environmental events we also rely on our survey data. In 
particular, we use a measure that captures whether respondents in our survey perceived environmental events to be 
present in their original location. See below for further details and an extensive discussion. 
17 For example, Hall 2016; Linke et al. 2015; Linke, Schutte, and Buhaug 2015; Blair et al. 2013; Oyefusi 2008; 
Schaffer and Spilker 2016. 
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chain leading from environmental change to migration – and then to conflict. Moreover, since it 
is hardly possible to systematically analyze actual conflict behavior at the individual level, we 
concentrate on the stage preceding real conflict by studying the willingness requirement for 
overcoming the barriers of violent collective action,18 namely conflict perceptions of 
environmental migrants.19  
In our survey, migrants could express their conflict perceptions with regard to different issue 
areas, such as economic hardship, political conflict, social challenges, and environmental stress. 
While some of these forms of conflict perceptions might not necessarily be directly related to 
real conflict (e.g., economic hardship), other types of conflict perceptions like perceived political 
conflict are closer to actual conflict behavior.20 Moreover, the literature emphasizes that 
perception is the first aspect of behavior,21 highlighting that there are strong links between 
conflict attitudes and actual conflict conduct.22 As a result, examining whether environmental 
events are associated with environmental migrants’ grievances, which eventually induce a 
heightened perception of conflict, will allow us to gain valuable insights into whether any 
presumed link between environmental change and conflict behavior rests on a sound micro-level 
foundation. 
Our argument is that direct exposure to environmental change in their former location shapes 
migrants’ conflict perception in their new place of residence. By inflicting casualties and 
destruction, environmental events have the potential to induce widespread grievances that could 
render exposed individuals to contemplate violence in order to rectify the situation that gave rise 
to these grievances. However, while people might be aggrieved by the “absolute” destruction of 
their livelihood, we argue that they are more likely to be aggrieved by their negative assessment 
of their “relative” well-being over time. We thus differentiate the impact of different 
																																								 																				
18 Gurr 1970; Sandler 1992. 
19 Rummel 1976, for example, identifies perception as the first aspect of behavior. 
20 We describe the operationalization of this variable and the underlying survey question in the research design. 
21 Rummel 1976. 
22 Linke et al. 2015 
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environmental events on individuals’ conflict perceptions, in particular gradual, long-term vs. 
sudden, short-term environmental events.  
Sudden, short-term environmental incidents should affect most individuals equally and people 
are exposed to these incidents only for a short period of time. Hence the likelihood to develop 
relative deprivation and grievances that will lead to an increased conflict perception is low. 
Short-term events thus lead to (absolute) grievances of the people affected and might even instill 
a sense of common fate and solidarity.23 In contrast, gradual, long-term environmental events, by 
fostering relative deprivations due to differences in adaptive capacities and a longer time period 
of exposure, should increase the likelihood of conflict perceptions. Here, individuals are exposed 
to small-scale adverse climatic conditions that make them steadily try to adapt their productive 
strategies (e.g. use drought resistant crops, invest in irrigation systems) until adaptation fails, and 
they then decide to migrate. Sustained exposure to climatic events and unsuccessful adaptation 
thus raises an individual’s (relative) deprivation as well as her conflict perception. The rationale 
is that deep-seated feelings of anger and injustice continue to live in the minds of migrants for a 
long time. Recent research from psychology24 suggests that exposure to and especially the 
duration of traumatic events can influence social functioning and how individuals perceive 
mechanisms aiming at promoting justice and fairness.  
We ultimately expect that migrants who were exposed to gradual, long-term environmental 
events are more likely to perceive conflict in their destination location than migrants who 
experienced sudden, short-term events. Figure 1 illustrates the theoretical contribution of this 
study. In the following, we develop this argument in detail. 
__________ 
Figure 1 here 
__________ 
																																								 																				
23	Drury et al. 2015. 
24 For example, Hecker et al. 2013; Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009; Hobfoll, Canetti-Nisim, and Johnson 2006; Vinck et 
al. 2007; Sullivan et al. 1981. 
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Conflict Perception and Its Determinants: Gradual, Long-Term vs. Sudden, Short-Term 
Environmental Events 
Are individuals who migrated from their former homes due to adverse environmental conditions 
more likely to perceive conflicts at their new locations? In fact, although there is evidence that 
conflict refugees are more likely to have developed social norms in which violence is seen as a 
normal way to address problems,25 migrants originating from conflict-affected areas do not 
always harbor conflictive attitudes in their new location.26 Furthermore, studies in psychology 
show that migrants experience “acculturative stress”27 in reaction to socio-economic and cultural 
predicaments encountered in the new location and “these stressors can be exacerbated by 
conditions inherent in the immigrants’ society of origin.”28 In light of this research, we aim at 
shedding new theoretical and empirical light on the environment-migration-conflict nexus by 
focusing on migrants’ conflict perceptions. 
While our approach of focusing on conflict perceptions merely allows making indirect 
inferences about actual conflict behavior, it mirrors a more recent strand of the literature on 
individual-level conflict perceptions. By analyzing popular support for different militant groups 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Blair et al.29 and Lyall et al.,30 for instance, claim that, and this is in 
line with our approach and contribution, without knowing how individuals in conflict settings 
perceive inflicted harms, we lack a key aspect of understanding the micro-level processes 
underlying these conflicts. Consequently, Lyall et al.31 suggest that “rather than relying solely on 
event data, we should integrate perceptions of harm and other individual level characteristics into 
our models if we are to understand how violence is understood by civilians and how it affects 
both attitudes and subsequent behavior.” Furthermore, research shows that individuals who are 
																																								 																				
25 Lischer 2008; Lyons 2007; Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1989; see also Salehyan 2007. 
26 Hall 2016; see also Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006. 
27 Acculturative stress is defined as a migrant’s “response […] to life events that are rooted in intercultural contact” 
(Berry 2006, 43). 
28 Sedikides et al. 2009, 363. 
29 Blair et al. 2013. 
30 Lyall et al. 2013. 
31 Lyall et al. 2013, 697. 
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dissatisfied with political and economic conditions are more susceptible to the manipulation by 
militant groups.32 Consequently, our research elaborates on one key component in the causal 
relationship between environmental change and conflict, and it rests on the assumption that 
without individuals perceiving environmentally induced migration as challenging enough to 
make them discontent with their current situation, environmental change is unlikely to play its 
envisaged role as a conflict promoter.  
As indicated above, we focus on the indirect links between climate change and conflict via 
migration. Earlier work on this channel produced only mixed findings, however. For example, 
Reuveny33 examines 38 cases of recognized environmental migration episodes, with about 50 
percent of them having seen conflict occurring. He concludes that it is, however, difficult to 
identify “purely environmental” clashes. Raleigh, Jordan, and Salehyan34 also find little evidence 
that environmentally induced migration worsens already volatile situations in the developing 
world. Ghimire, Ferreira, and Dorfman35 report that displacement caused by catastrophic floods 
is likely to lengthen the duration of an existing civil conflict, but it does not affect the risk of new 
outbreaks. Moreover, Bohnet, Cottier, and Hug36 show that disaster-induced displacement does 
not significantly increase the risk of social unrest. However, for the period 2008-2011, they 
obtain some evidence that administrative units in the direct vicinity of a flood and displacement 
triggered by that event had a significantly higher probability of conflict. Finally, using irregular 
rainfall patterns in migrant-sending Indian states as an instrument for migration, Bhavnani and 
Lacina37 demonstrate that greater rates of internal migration are associated with a higher risk of 
riots. 
																																								 																				
32 Stern 2010; Piazza 2007; Esposito, and Voll 1996. 
33 Reuveny 2007. 
34 Raleigh, Jordan, and Salehyan 2008. 
35 Ghimire, Ferreira, and Dorfman 2015. 
36 Bohnet, Cottier, and Hug 2014. 
37 Bhavnani and Lacina 2013. 
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Against this background, the literature demonstrates that environmental change can lead to 
conditions of resource scarcity and, thus, as a stressor that potentially endangers individuals’ 
well-being, decreases their personal income from production, or lowers their chances for future 
employment.38 Accordingly, it is likely that environmental change directly and negatively affects 
the perceptions of individuals regarding their satisfaction with and well-being at their present 
location.39 When the environmental stress becomes too severe, people might be increasingly 
discontent by the widening gap between their actual level of economic achievement and the level 
they feel they deserve and could have achieved under better climatic conditions.40 Moreover, 
some individuals are likely to be more dissatisfied, because elites could use their power to 
maintain their standards of living despite declining environmental conditions. These economic 
and political inequalities may incite relative deprivation and grievances that shape individuals’ 
conflict perceptions.41  
In his context, we contend that the impact on conflict perception depends on the type of 
environmental change, as distinct environmental events should affect individuals differently. To 
this end, our argument distinguishes between gradual, long-term and sudden onset, short-term 
environmental change.42 Gradual, long-term environmental events, such as droughts or 
desertification, have a rather small immediate impact on individuals. In addition, people may 
adjust their productive strategies over time when facing such problems. Responses include, 
among others, investments in irrigation systems, the use of drought-resistant plant and animal 
varieties, or the diversification of income sources. Despite the relatively small effects in the 
short-term and the plausible adaptation strategies, however, such events are in the longer term 
																																								 																				
38 For example, Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel 2015b; Dell, Jones, and Olken 2014; Toll 2009. 
39 For example, Maddison and Rehdanz 2011; Luechinger and Raschky 2009; Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Gowdy 2007. 
40 Berkowitz 1989. 
41 Davies 1962; Gurr 1970; see also Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 
2011. 
42 Koubi et al. 2016; Renaud et al. 2011. 
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likely to disrupt economic growth,43 raise income inequality,44 and weaken state capacity.45 
Furthermore, all these aspects of gradual, long-term events might particularly increase the 
willingness for violence46 and, hence, intensify conflict perceptions.47  
Gradual, long-term environmental events are then likely to fuel personal grievances, since 
individuals’ life satisfaction not only depends on perceived differences between what they 
possess and what they do not, but also on whether they observe progress in their own current or 
future status.48 Prediger, Vollan, and Herrmann49 demonstrate that sustained exposure to adverse 
climatic conditions might affect the likelihood of conflict behavior. They report results from a 
joy-of-destruction game in Namibia, where pastoralists, who were exposed to resource scarcity 
due to prolonged drought, were more likely to exhibit antisocial behavior – a higher willingness 
to reduce a fellow resource user’s income at their own cost – relative to comparable neighboring 
pastoralists who had not suffered from similar sustained scarcity. Such particular experiences 
can have a lasting impact on individuals’ cognitive, moral, and personality development as well 
as interpersonal relationships and coping abilities.50 Social learning theorists, moreover, 
emphasize that people become socialized to aggressive behavior and violence when they are 
constantly exposed to deprivation and grievances over a longer period of time.51 This is 
																																								 																				
43 Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel 2015b; Dell, Jones, and Olken 2012; Barrios, Bertinelli, and Strobl 2010. 
44 Dennig et al. 2015; Reardon and Taylor 1996. 
45 Nel and Righarts 2008; Biermann and Dingwerth 2004.  
46 Agnew 2012 not only points to higher temperatures and ensuing food shortages in raising crime levels, but also 
suggests that growing inequality and poverty triggered by climate induced economic volatility may contribute to an 
increase in violence.  
47 It is also worth noting that existing psychology research suggests that climate change may increase the likelihood 
of physical aggression and conflict due to the direct impact of rising temperatures (see, e.g., Anderson 2012; on the 
psychological impacts of climate change, see Doherty and Clayton 2011). In particular, experiments demonstrate 
that uncomfortably prolonged warm temperatures increase participants’ feelings of anger, their perceptions of 
hostility in observed dyadic interactions, and their initial retaliatory aggressive behavior against a person whose 
prior harmful behavior was of an ambiguous nature (Anderson et al. 2000). In addition, Anderson and Delisi 2011 
suggest that beyond the direct heat effects, growing malnutrition may prepare individuals for higher levels of 
aggression. 
48 Davies 1962; Gurr 1970. 
49 Prediger, Vollan, and Herrmann 2014. 
50 Taft, Creech, and Kachadourian 2012. 
51 Berkowitz 1993; Bandura 1973. 
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especially the case when aggressive behavior is seen as appropriate as it might be the case in 
situations of resource scarcity.52  
Consequently, by breeding relative deprivation, a gradual, long-term environmental event 
promotes grievances that could lead to the creation of individual conflict perceptions, which 
persist in individuals’ minds for a long time.53 Sen exemplifies how retained grievances shape 
the way in which potential conflict might materialize: “[…] the nineteenth-century Irish Famine 
not only represented massive deprivation and hardship, but also led to deep-seated feelings of 
anger and disrespect that continue to live on in the minds of later generations that cannot have 
been directly affected.”54 Therefore, we expect environmental migrants having experienced 
gradual, long-term environmental events to be more likely to reveal conflict perceptions in their 
new location as they carry grievances to the new location. 
Sudden, short-term environmental events such as storms and floods, conversely, despite the 
immediacy and the possible scale of their impact on the society in form of, e.g., a large number 
of casualties, considerable damage to agricultural crop, or the destruction of infrastructure, are 
unlikely to generate feelings of relative deprivation and widespread grievances that shape 
individual conflict perceptions. These events usually inflict hardship on all individuals 
irrespective of whether they earn their livelihoods from agriculture, manufacturing or services 
and, hence, are more likely to lead to absolute deprivation, which in turn leads people to rather 
blame fate than their own adaptive capacity vis-à-vis others in society.  
Moreover, the equal exposure to a common fate at the group level might even lead to 
increased solidarity or pro-social behavior between victims of disasters as the literature on 
disasters in social psychology shows.55 Drury et al., for example, argue that the perception of a 
common fate induces a shared social identity, which in turn makes survivors of environmental 
																																								 																				
52 See also Ember and Ember 1994. 
53 See also Catani et al. 2008. 
54 Sen 2011, 77. 
55	Drury et. al 2015; Drury, Cocking, and Reicher 2009; Jencson 2001; Rodriguez, Trainor, and Quarantelli 2006. 
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disasters show solidarity rather than acting antisocial.56 While such solidarity may be confined to 
the immediate aftermaths of disasters, it should render the occurrence of relative grievances less 
likely. 
Finally, despite the severity of their impact, short-term environmental events are typically 
only of a rather brief duration. Hence individuals’ experience with any potentially aggressive 
behavior and violence should not be that strongly developed. Yet, a common argument in the 
literature is that there is an increased risk for future aggression when individuals become 
socialized for violence in conflictive environments.57 That said, affected individuals must be 
exposed to these negative environmental effects for a longer period of time. While this is the 
case for gradual, long-term environmental events, this is unlikely to be given for sudden, short-
term ones and hence migrants should be less likely to carry forward feelings of violence and 
aggression to their new location. To this end, we hypothesize that environmental migrants 
having experienced sudden, short-term environmental events are less likely to reveal conflict 
perceptions in their new location. 
 
Research Design  
Survey Overview 
In order to systematically analyze the determinants of migrants’ conflict perception, we rely on 
newly compiled data that allow for a quantitative analysis of individual-level conflict 
perceptions. In a first step, we focus on a data set comprising migrants only, i.e., people who 
decided to leave a specific area that experienced an environmental event and moved to another 
area within the same country. However, as migrants are unlikely to be a random sample and 
since those factors influencing conflict perceptions might also affect the initial decision to 
migrate, the Appendix discusses an analysis that focuses on both non-migrants and migrants who 
																																								 																				
56 They provide empirical support for their theoretical argument by studying study the Chilean earthquake of 2010. 
57 Haer and Böhmelt 2016; Taft, Creech, and Kachadourian 2012; Holt, Buckley, and Whelan 2008; Garbarino 
1995; Berkowitz 1993; Nordstrom 1992; Bandura 1973. 
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originally come from the same area. When comparing individuals who have stayed in the area 
with those who have left, we are able to isolate the effect of environmental stressors on the 
decision to migrate as comparing individuals from the same region ensures that the context for 
all individuals is identical; at the same time, we can effectively control for selection effects. That 
said, the main results presented below and those obtained via the selection estimator do not differ 
in either substance or the direction of the effects. 
Our data are based on individual, micro-level surveys in five countries: Vietnam, Cambodia, 
Uganda, Nicaragua, and Peru. The surveys were conducted between 2013 and 2014 and yielded 
3,689 completed questionnaires in total of which about 50 percent (N=1,854) stem from 
migrants. Note that the models discussed below are based on smaller samples due to missing 
values on some of the explanatory variables (discussed below). We focus on internal migration, 
since there is strong consensus in the literature that most migration flows associated with 
environmental factors are of an internal nature.58 
The five case-study countries were chosen according to the following criteria. First, countries 
are regularly affected by weather-related events (storms, floods, droughts, etc.) and are 
vulnerable to climatic changes.59 Second, since our theory postulates different individual 
reactions to gradual, long-term vs. sudden, short-term environmental events, countries contain 
different regions experiencing these types of stressors in order to disentangle the effects of the 
two types of environmental events. And, third, countries come from different regions of the 
world (Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Central and Latin America).60 Since existing 
research emphasizes that the environment-conflict relationship is rather context specific, our 
rationale for this last selection criterion was to study countries that widely differ in their political 
systems, their economic composition, and development, but are rather similar in their 
																																								 																				
58 Hunter Luna, and Norton 2015, 3; Foresight Project 2011; Raleigh, Jordan, and Salehyan 2008. 
59 Kreft and Eckstein 2014; ND-GAIN 2013; EM-DAT/OFDA/CRED 2013; World Bank 2013. 
60 While we sought to cover different regions of the world that may be particularly vulnerable to climatic changes, 
the selected countries are not representative of a particular region or continent. 
14 
 
vulnerability to climate change in that they experience both climate-induced gradual, long-term 
and sudden, short-term environmental events. While selecting such diverse countries might 
lower internal validity to some degree, our intention is to enhance external validity by showing 
that the same relationship between environmental change, migration, and conflict perceptions 
exists across a wider range of countries that do differ in key underlying political and socio-
economic conditions. Following these three criteria, the five countries we have chosen provide 
an ideal testing ground for our theory.  
Based on information obtained from the EM-DAT/OFDA/CRED International Disaster 
Database61 and archival research, we first identified relevant regions/provinces in each survey 
country that are mainly characterized by one particular environmental stressor that can be 
classified either as a gradual, long-term or a sudden, short-term environmental event.62 In turn, 
we randomly chose the departments/districts for the location of the survey.63 Finally, we 
randomly selected communes or villages in these departments or districts by using a grid system 
with random starting points in which the interviews of the non-migrants took place. 
In contrast, a random sampling of migrants is hardly possible, since (by definition) they do no 
longer live in the same community as non-migrants. Furthermore, in the locations they have 
migrated to, we do not know ex-ante whether a specific person has migrated from relevant areas. 
Hence, we relied on a snowballing or chain-referral64 process to identify individuals who came 
from the same locations as the non-migrants, but who left their homes to live elsewhere, usually 
the regional or the national capital. Starting points for the snowballing were obtained by asking 
the non-migrant interviewees whether they knew of any individuals who had left their 
																																								 																				
61 EM-DAT/OFDA/CRED 2013. 
62 Note that there would be no variation on the presence of environmental stressors, i.e., everyone experiences 
environmental stress, if we relied on a measure of objectively present environmental stress. Yet, we rather capture 
perceptions of environmental events and, in turn, conflict and thus there is variance and our research design is 
appropriate. We describe below how these perceptions pertaining to conflict (our dependent variable) and 
environmental events (our main explanatory variables) are operationalized. 
63 The appendix gives an overview of the locations of the surveys. 
64 This sampling method is frequently used in sociological studies of such hidden populations (see also Laczko and 
Aghazarm 2009; Warner 2011). 
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community or district after having experienced the same environmental event(s), but did not 
belong to the same household. In total, and as indicated above, our sample comprises 1,854 
migrants across the five countries, while a migrant is then also the unit of analysis.65 
To illustrate this further, consider the following examples for each event in one of our sample 
countries. First, with respect to long-term events, individuals experienced droughts in Uganda in 
the Kotido and Moroto districts in the Karamoja region (Northeast Uganda) migrated to Mbale 
and Kampala. The migrants were then interviewed in Mbale and Kampala, while the relevant 
non-migrants were interviewed in the Karamoja region. Second, for an example of a sudden, 
short-term event, consider Vietnam: here, individuals experienced cyclones in the Giao Thuy 
district in the Red River Delta (North Vietnam) migrated to Hanoi, whereas individuals who 
suffered from floods in the Chau Phy district in the Mekong Delta (South Vietnam) move to Ho 
Chi Minh City. Thus, migrants were interviewed in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City about why they 
migrated and about their conflict perceptions, non-migrants accordingly in the areas of Giao 
Thuy or Chau Phy.  
 
Operationalization of Dependent Variables 
In order to capture conflict perceptions, we rely on five differently specified, yet interrelated 
dependent variables. All of these items are based on the survey and, hence, code migrants’ 
perceptions. In detail, the first dependent variable captures conflict perception in the most 
general sense, as we analyze an item that captures whether respondents indicated they “faced any 
challenges in their current location” (1; 0 otherwise). With this formulation, we not only capture 
individuals’ conflict perception, but also conflict perception in the most broadest way as 
“challenges” could pertain to any conflict or tension (even low intensity ones) in the migrants’ 
																																								 																				
65 All interviews were personal interviews consisting of both closed and open-ended questions that lasted for about 
30 minutes. We asked all individuals about their experience with the latest environmental event, certain personal 
information such as age, profession, or education as well as household specific questions. The full survey 
questionnaire is included in the appendix. 
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new location. Out of 1,853 completed questionnaires for this conflict perception item, 921 (49.70 
percent) individuals stated that they perceived some form of challenge in the place they moved 
to. Hence our sample is basically balanced for this first dependent variable.66 
However, not all conflict perceptions are created equal and the first dependent variable may 
be too broad. To this end, we also asked respondents whether they could assign specific types of 
conflicts to the challenge identified. Table 1 specifies the sub-categories for these types of 
conflict perceptions. Using this information, we created four additional binary dependent 
variables, one for each sub-category of the general conflict-perception variable, and re-estimated 
the models. These types pertain to (1) social/psychological conflict perceptions (N=663/1,853; 
35.78 percent), (2) economic conflict perceptions (N=747/1,853; 40.31 percent), (3) 
environmental conflict perceptions (N=302/1,853; 16.30 percent), and (4) political conflict 
perceptions (N=53/1,853; 2.86 percent). With the approach of relying on various different 
conflict perception variables, we are not only able to ensure a maximum of generalizability for 
our findings, but also that we obtain an in-depth disaggregated perspective on the drivers of 
migrants’ conflict perception. 
__________ 
Table 1 here 
__________ 
Note that the descriptive statistics (as displayed in the bottom rows of Table 1) suggest that 
some assumptions on the migration-conflict nexus are unlikely to hold. That is, earlier studies 
rely strongly on the claim that most migrants suffer from grievances and frustration regarding 
																																								 																				
66 A possible objection to our approach might be that we cannot fully rule out an influence at the “new home” on 
conflict perceptions. That is, among others, Reuveny 2007, Shuval 2001, or Dancygier 2010 demonstrate that 
conflict is likely to emerge at receiving locations of migrants. For example, migrants’ new environments could be 
less welcoming and people in receiving places may find some reasons for migration more legitimate than others 
(Sedikides et al. 2009; Berry 1997). That said, our distinction between migrants that lived in the new location for a 
fairly long time and those that only recently arrived allows us to safely assume that our results are due to what 
happened “at the source,” i.e., migrants’ previous place of residence. Specifically, migrants that only recently 
arrived at the destination location might have been less exposed to any conflict, stress, or challenges; conversely, 
migrants who spent a considerably longer time in the new location do have a higher chance of having been exposed 
to such conflict there. We return to this issue in the appendix. 
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their situation, carry these perceptions and attitudes forward to the new location, which then 
increases the risk of conflict there.67 Our data highlight that not all migrants have conflict 
perceptions, but that there actually is a lot of variance on conflict perception both at the general 
and more disaggregated levels. 
 
Operationalization of Main Explanatory Items 
Our two main independent variables on environmental change pertain to sudden, short-term and 
gradual, long-term events, respectively. As in the case of the dependent variable, these items are 
not based on “objective” data, but interviewees’ answers in the survey and, therefore, their 
perceptions regarding the type of the particular environmental event.68 We do not use objective 
meteorological data because individuals tend to react to environmental changes based on their 
perception of it, rather than environmental change identified objectively with scientific data.69 
Environmental perception encompasses direct experience of environmental events, yet, mediated 
by individuals’ ability to cope with environmental change.70  
For capturing these, we asked respondents to describe the main weather events they 
experienced over the past five years in their location/place of origin. Respondents could choose 
between several events such as heavy rain, storms and floods, or drought and salinity, but could 
also list any other weather occurrence that was not listed in the questionnaire, or were able to 
state that no incidents have occurred in the recent past. On the one hand, if individuals 
mentioned that they experienced any heavy rain, storm, flood, hail/snow, hurricane, cyclone, 
typhoon, and/or landslide/mudslide, we coded this event as a sudden, short-term environmental 
																																								 																				
67Lischer 2008; Lyons 2007. 
68 Moreover, recent research contrasts individual perceptions of environmental events with actual climatic events 
and finds that migrants and non-migrants indeed perceive climate change in different ways. In particular, while non-
migrants are slightly better in judging the actual extremeness of sudden, short-term events, migrants are slightly 
more accurate in assessing the actual extremeness of gradual, long-term events (Koubi, Stoll, and Spilker 2016). The 
appendix provides the survey questions, and also outlines what specifically refers to an environmental event and 
how this is measured. We return to this issue in the conclusion. 
69 Dessai et al. 2004. 
70 Black et al. 2013, 2011; Mortreux and Barnett 2009. 
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event. According to our theoretical arguments, we expect that short-term environmental events 
do not have much of an impact on individuals’ conflict perception. On the other hand, we coded 
salinity, drought, or desertification as gradual, long-term environmental events. Due to their 
long-term nature, we expect these to lead to more grievances and, thus, a higher likelihood of 
having perceptions of conflict.  
 
Operationalization of Control Variables 
Coming to our control variables, we build on earlier research on conflict, conflict perception, and 
individual-level migration. Most of our broad set of controls not only correlate with the conflict 
perception dependent variables and, thus, address the issue of omitted variable bias, but they 
may have also influenced an individual’s decision to migrate in the first place. This latter aspect 
is particularly important for controlling for possible selection problems. The data for all of the 
control variables comes from our survey. First, there is a respondent’s gender and age, as women 
as well as older individuals are less likely to migrate and may also have different conflict views 
than males or younger respondents. For example, age might be related to psychological 
phenomena, such as depression, under certain circumstances, although “most studies have shown 
that older adults differ little from younger adults in their approaches to coping with stress.”71 
And Eisler, Skidmore, and Ward,72 among others, report that “stress appraisal is gender related,” 
with men being more stress-prone than women.  
Second, following recent explanatory models of migration networks emphasizing that 
migration decisions are made in a broader socio-economic context,73 we also incorporate a 
binary variable on whether another household member has migrated. Such networks increase the 
likelihood that relatives will follow once the first migrant has settled in her/his destination by 
																																								 																				
71 Aldwin 1991, 174; see also Mirowsky and Ross 2003. 
72 Eisler, Skidmore, and Ward 1988. 
73 Hunter, Luna, and Norton 2015. 
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sharply reducing the costs and risks associated with migration.74 This household-migration 
variable is also likely to affect conflict perceptions: if an individual moves to a place in which a 
household member already lives, the adaptation to the new environment might be less difficult 
and existing grievances could be less well pronounced.75 
To control for potential economic influences, we rely on four different proxy variables from 
our survey, which we introduce into our models separately due to collinearity concerns. In 
general, the better the economic condition of an individual, the less likely she may perceive 
conflict in her new location. This corresponds to earlier research linking economic hardship with 
conflict and stress perceptions.76 In addition, an individual’s economic condition could also have 
affected the initial decision to migrate.77 First, we consider a respondent’s level of education as a 
proxy for economic opportunity via three dummy variables: whether a respondent has no formal 
education, whether a respondent received at maximum primary education, or whether a 
respondent received at maximum secondary education. Individuals with higher education levels 
serve as the baseline category. 
Second, there is the interviewers’ classification of the respondents’ economic household 
status. As Hunter, Luna, and Norton emphasize “migration is often a household strategy to 
diversify risk.”78 In particular, interviewers classified whether a household is economically 
below average, at average, or above average. We constructed two dummy variables – below and 
above average – based on this information, while those individuals with an average economic 
status constitute the reference category.  
Third, there is the respondents’ self-assessment as to whether economic reasons influenced 
their decision to migrate or not. In particular, all migrants were asked about their reasons to 
migrate and they could choose between, e.g., social, political, environmental, or economic 
																																								 																				
74 Massey, Axinn, and Ghimire 2010; Massey 1990. 
75 Adger 2003; Kawachi and Berkman 2001. 
76 E.g., Mirowsky and Ross 2003; Armstrong and Schulman 1990. 
77 Lilleør and Van den Broeck 2011. 
78 Hunter, Luna, and Norton 2015, 1. 
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reasons. For all respondents who stated that economic reasons contributed to their decision to 
migrate, we assigned the value of 1 to the variable Economic Reason (0 otherwise). While this 
self-assessment might be problematic as individuals could have the incentive to over- or 
underestimate certain factors due to personal reasons (e.g., migrants might not want to admit that 
they are not doing well economically), this variable controls for the potential self-selection (i.e., 
self-selection into migration) problem more accurately than the other items. In light of this 
rationale, individuals’ self-selection into migration due to economic reasons might also affect 
whether they perceive conflict in their new location: people who go to a new location of 
residence “more voluntarily” to improve their economic situation tend to perceive less conflict 
than those who were forced to move to a new place due to changing environmental conditions.  
The final variable as an alternative determinant of conflict perceptions and a control for the 
opportunity costs of migration captures a respondent’s profession. This is a proxy for economic 
well-being and we include the following five professions in our models, while individuals 
working in the agriculture sector are the baseline: civil servants, individuals living from business 
sales, workers (industry, handicrafts, etc.), individuals with elementary professions such as day 
labor, and individuals living from remittances or other sources of income. 
 
Empirical Findings 
How do perceptions of sudden, short-term and gradual, long-term environmental events in their 
previous location affect migrants’ perception of conflict in their new home? We have pooled the 
data across the five countries to examine the aggregated conflict-perception item, and we rely on 
a multi-level regression framework that allows us to control for influences beyond the micro 
level. Table 2 reports the results of the multi-level logistic regression models for the aggregated 
conflict-perception variable, i.e., the most general and broadly defined way to capture migrants’ 
conflict perception. Models 1-4 are virtually identical as we consider in all these models our core 
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variables of interest (Gradual, Long-Term Events and Sudden, Short-Term Events) as well as the 
standard individual-level demographics. However, we vary the set of variables on potential 
economic influences: Model 1 focuses on the education variables, Model 2 only considers the 
household-level income, Model 3 relies on whether a migrant moved due to economic reasons, 
and Model 4 focuses on the occupation of a respondent.  
__________ 
Table 2 here 
__________ 
Due to the structure of our data stemming from the hierarchical sampling procedure within 
countries, we use a random-intercept approach. As described above, we deliberately chose 
specific regions in each of the countries, because of the environmental problems they face, then 
relied on random sampling below this level, and used this information to identify the migrants in 
turn. Hence, we also have to control for certain regional factors located at either the macro or 
meso levels. Similarly, Hunter, Luna, and Norton point to influences coming from “a region’s 
historical-political context.”79 Hence, we incorporate a country-level as well as a regional-level 
intercept to account for the specific hierarchical, three-level nature of the pooled data set in each 
of the models in Table 2 and the models on the disaggregated conflict-perception variables 
(Tables 3-6). This accounts for unobserved heterogeneity at the regional and country levels.80 
Both random intercepts are modeled according to a normal distribution.81 
Two main results follow from Table 2. First, standard demographic variables have little 
impact on migrants’ conflict perception. Only economic conditions do matter under some 
circumstances. Specifically, we find that women (Female) and younger individuals (Age) are 
more likely to perceive conflict in their new locations, but the relationship is not statistically 
																																								 																				
79 Hunter, Luna, and Norton 2015, 5. 
80 Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2009. Our results are robust across different specifications of the structure of the 
covariance matrix for the random effects, including when allowing all variances and covariances to be distinct. 
81 Gelman and Hill 2009. 
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significant at conventional levels when looking at the models relying on the aggregate dependent 
variable. And while there is a conflict-perception lowering effect of networks, i.e., if a member 
of the household has already migrated, this is associated with lower conflict perception, this 
impact is also not statistically significant. For the economic conditions, it seems that neither the 
occupational status nor economic reasons to migrate in the first place seem to play a crucial role, 
yet, less educated migrants and those coming from a poor household are more likely to have 
overly conflictive perceptions. Thus there is some evidence that poverty leads to heightened 
conflict perceptions, which could then fuel actual conflictive behavior. This is in line with earlier 
studies at the individual or macro level. For example, Urdal82 argues that violence is strongly 
associated with an unequal access to employment or education. Situations of widespread, severe 
inequality then heighten the potential for alienated, frustrated, and excluded populations and, 
particularly, younger men to engage in violence.83 Brett and Specht84 also confirm this as they 
find strong micro-level support for the expectation that poverty, lack of schooling, and low 
alternative income opportunities are important reasons for conflict. Overall, however, these 
demographic variables  
Second, we find support for our theoretical argument that it is particularly gradual, long-term 
environmental change that affects migrants’ grievances, which then makes these individuals 
more likely to perceive conflict in their new location. This is supported by the positive and 
constantly significant coefficient estimate for Gradual, Long-Term Events in Table 2. In 
contrast, Sudden, Short-Term Events is associated with a positive coefficient estimate, but it is 
statistically insignificant throughout Models 1-4. As coefficients in non-linear setups like our 
hierarchical models for binary variables cannot be interpreted directly, we also calculated 
predicted probabilities for Conflict Perception=1 for Gradual, Long-Term Events, while holding 
all other variables constant at their means. Figure 1 displays these substantive effects for each 
																																								 																				
82 Urdal 2006; Moser and Rodgers 2005. 
83 See also Goldstone 2001. 
84 Brett and Specht 2004; see also Collier 2000. 
23 
 
model in Table 2 and also for the disaggregated conflict-perception items (Tables 3-6) we 
discuss below. 
__________ 
Figure 2 here 
__________ 
When examining Models 1-4 pertaining to Figure 1 (Gradual, Long-Term Events), we see 
that all scenarios independent of model specification are associated with positive probabilities of 
conflict perception. For example, the probability to perceive challenges in the new environment 
is on average nearly 60 percent when Gradual, Long-Term Events is set to 1 and all other 
variables held constant at their mean values. In other words, Gradual, Long-Term Events have, 
ceteris paribus, a strong and statistically significant effect on conflict perception.  
__________ 
Tables 3-6 here 
__________ 
Coming to the disaggregated versions of our dependent variable, Table 3 summarizes the 
findings when focusing on social/psychological conflict perceptions, Table 4 reports our results 
for economic conflict perceptions, Table 5 pertains to environmental challenges, and Table 6 
relates to political conflict. Two findings appear particularly striking. On one hand, our core 
result of a positive and significant effect of Gradual, Long-Term Events holds across all models 
in Tables 3-6. Hence it is not a particular type of conflict perception that drives our estimations, 
but gradual, long-term environmental events at the original location/home of a migrant affect 
conflict perceptions generally. The substantive results for Gradual, Long-Term Events 
summarized in Figure 1 support this. For both economic challenges and social/psychological 
problems the probability to perceive challenges in the new environment lies at around 45 percent 
when Gradual, Long-Term Events is set to 1 and all other variables held constant at their mean 
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values.  The predicted probabilities we obtain are somewhat smaller in substance for political 
and environmental challenges, yet, positive and statistically different from 0. The smaller effect 
size is likely to be driven by the fact that fewer people actually perceived conflict at a political 
(N=53/1,853; 2.86 percent) or an environmental level (N=302/1,853; 16.30 percent). 
In the disaggregated conflict-perception estimations (Tables 3-6), some of the demographic 
controls now exert an impact that is statistically significant at conventional levels. For example, 
female migrants are much more likely than males to perceive social/psychological conflict 
(Table 3), but are statistically less likely than male migrants to perceive political conflict (Table 
6). Second, the income-household effect we identified in Table 2 seems to be driven by those 
cases pertaining to social/psychological conflict. That is, conflict is much more likely to be 
perceived in poorer households; however, this effect largely disappears when looking at other 
types of conflict perception (although the effect for Poor Household persists in Models 10 and 
14). Third, if someone migrated due to economic reasons, this person is also more likely to 
perceive economic conflict (Model 11). The variable Economic Reason is not associated with a 
statistically significant coefficient estimate in any other model. However, it may well be that 
endogeneity is responsible for this result: a migrant anticipates conflict at home, migrates due to 
this, and carries this attitude forward to the new location; she is then, not surprisingly, also more 
sensitive toward economic challenges. 
In order to ensure the robustness of our results, we changed a variety of model specifications 
and re-run the estimations. In addition to incorporating other important drivers of conflict 
perceptions, such as a variable capturing political exclusion, we also show that our results are 
robust to controlling for selection into migration by employing a heckman-type probit selection 
model. All results can be found in the online Appendix. The Appendix also provides detailed 






Do environmental changes via their impact on migration increase the risk of conflict? While 
policymakers, the media, and public institutions tend to highlight this possibility, only few 
scientific studies offer a direct test of this relationship. Our research contributes toward filling 
this gap by studying individual migrants’ conflict perceptions and by shedding light on the 
impact of environmental change on these perceptions. This approach allows us to better 
understand the causal mechanism that supposedly leads from environmental change via 
migration to conflict behavior.  
We theoretically argued that individual-level conflict perceptions are conditional on the type 
of environmental event experienced by migrants. Sudden, short-term environmental incidents 
should affect most individuals equally and people are exposed to these environmental changes 
only for a short period of time. Hence the likelihood to develop relative deprivation and 
grievances that will lead to an increased conflict perception is low. In contrast, gradual, long-
term environmental events, by fostering relative deprivations due to differences in adaptive 
capacities and a longer time period of exposure, should induce heightened grievances and 
migrants should be likely to perceive conflicts at their new locations.  
Our empirical analysis relying on individual-level survey data from five developing countries 
strongly and robustly supports our argument. Whereas sudden, short-term environmental events 
do not significantly affect migrants’ conflict perception, migrants who have experienced gradual, 
long-term environmental changes are significantly more likely to perceive conflict. These 
findings, while clearly highlighting the conflict potential of environmental migrants, suggest that 
previous treatments of environmental change, migration, and conflict may have been overly 
deterministic: not all migrants are always more “conflict-prone” under any circumstance.  
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Against this background, one limitation of our approach is the reliance on pure perception-
based measures in both assessing environmental events and conflict, which is rooted in our 
motivation to study the micro foundation of the climate change-migration-conflict nexus. Using 
either objective data on environmental change or on conflict would automatically imply a shift to 
a more aggregated level of analysis. Yet, with this kind of aggregation comes the challenge to 
show that environmental change indeed triggers individuals to become migrants in the first 
place, and that these kinds of migrants then might contribute to actual violence in their new host 
regions. One way for future research to overcome this challenge might be to rely on spatially 
disaggregated data. While such data exist for environmental change, we do not know of any such 
source for migration patterns. However, new data-compilation efforts, such as the use of remote 
sensing data to track the movement of migrants in regions with adverse environmental 
conditions, seems to us as one way forward.  
In general, our results lead to important implications for existing theories of environmental 
conflict. While environmental migration does not necessarily lead to conflictive behavior under 
all circumstances, still there might be situations in which environmentally induced migrants can 
indeed be drivers of and behind conflict. This underscores the need to thoroughly examine the 
mechanisms that affect environmental migrants’ conflict behavior. Priority should be placed on 
the development and testing of theories that account for plausible intervening and conditional 
factors, since the type of an environmental event and the nature of the local context in which it 
occurs as well as individual characteristics can exacerbate the challenges people face; and they 
can create new risks when people move.  
It is, as a result, crucial to understand the exact causes of why migrants left their homes to be 
able to prevent potential conflict at new locations. Furthermore, it is equally important to 
examine the role played by perceptions. Incorporating and better understanding individual 
perceptions of climatic changes requires addressing the “why” behind these perceptions. Only 
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then can we be able to comprehensively explain why people react to environmental changes the 
way they do and, thereby, are better positioned to study their conflict behavior. Finally, in order 
to achieve a robust, general understanding of the environmental migration-conflict nexus, we 
concur with Lyall, Blair, and Imai85 that we should strive to connect individual conflict 
perceptions to actual conflict behavior and to group-level conflict by elevating individual 
conflict perceptions “from their current neglected status in our theories to the foreground of our 
study of civil war dynamics.” 
																																								 																				
85 Lyall, Blair, and Imai 2013, 697 
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Table 1. Conflict Perception – Survey Questions Overview and Descriptive Statistics 
 General Conflict Perceptions 
Social/ 
Psychological  Economic  Environmental  Political  
Question Text 
Could you please 
tell us if you are 
facing any 
challenges in our 
current location?  













Ø It is not as easy 
as I thought it 























Ø No access to 
health care 
Ø Not enough 
money to 
purchase food 
Ø  Other 
Ø Poor sanitary 
conditions 
Ø No regular 
access to water 





Ø There is 
conflict within 
my community 
Ø There is 
conflict outside 
my community 
that is affecting 
me 
























Table 2. General Conflict Perception Multilevel Logistic Regression Models 
 












     
Sudden, Short-Term Events 0.119 0.061 0.120 0.087 
 (0.161) (0.173) (0.160) (0.162) 
Gradual, Long-Term Events 0.496 0.397 0.499 0.504 
  (0.138)***  (0.154)**  (0.138)***  (0.139)*** 
Female 0.093 0.114 0.089 0.093 
 (0.111) (0.135) (0.110) (0.111) 
Age -0.003 -0.005 -0.008 -0.009 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Household Member Migrated -0.147 -0.037 -0.129 -0.132 
 (0.110) (0.133) (0.110) (0.111) 
No Education -0.164    
 (0.292)    
Primary Education -0.266    
 (0.199)    
Secondary Education -0.263    
  (0.130)**    
Poor Household  0.564   
   (0.180)***   
Rich Household  -0.189   
   (0.213)    
Economic Reason   0.031  
    (0.139)  
Civil Servant    -0.094 
    (0.233) 
Business Sales    -0.041 
     (0.150) 
Craft and Trade Workers    -0.182 
    (0.227) 
Elementary Occupation    0.169 
    (0.185) 
Other Sources of Income    -0.199 
     (0.355) 
Constant 0.082 -0.241 0.014 0.103 
 (0.473) (0.501) (0.475) (0.478) 
     
Country Variance 0.775 0.804 0.760 0.776 
 (0.559) (0.557) (0.535) (0.549) 
District Variance 0.189 0.149 0.189 0.194 
 (0.084) (0.086) (0.083) (0.085) 
     
Observations 1,804 1,316 1,812 1,781 
Number of Groups 5 5 5 5 
Log Likelihood -1,069.549 -762.881 -1,076.723 -1,061.441 
Wald c2 20.40*** 20.00*** 16.40** 19.54** 
Table entries are coefficients from multilevel logistic regression models with country level and district level random effects; 
standard errors in parentheses. 
 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
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Table 3. Social/Psychological Conflict Multilevel Logistic Regression Models 








     
Sudden, Short-Term Events 0.130 0.161 0.106 0.046 
 (0.169) (0.184) (0.168) (0.171) 
Gradual, Long-Term Events 0.664 0.578 0.666 0.640 
  (0.147)***  (0.177)***  (0.146)***  (0.149)*** 
Female 0.230 0.303 0.233 0.232 
  (0.117)**  (0.141)**  (0.115)**  (0.117)** 
Age -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Household Member Migrated -0.228 -0.152 -0.200 -0.167 
  (0.116)* (0.139)  (0.115)* (0.117) 
No Education 0.132    
 (0.277)    
Primary Education -0.124    
 (0.219)    
Secondary Education -0.206    
  (0.142)    
Poor Household  0.593   
   (0.188)***   
Rich Household  -0.536   
   (0.222)**    
Economic Reason   -0.015  
    (0.149)  
Civil Servant    0.220 
    (0.250) 
Business Sales    0.030 
     (0.154) 
Craft and Trade Workers    -0.186 
    (0.256) 
Elementary Occupation    -0.112 
    (0.208) 
Other Sources of Income    -0.489 
     (0.479) 
Constant -0.822 -1.133 -0.857 -0.786 
  (0.450)*  (0.541)**  (0.468)*  (0.480)* 
     
Country Variance 0.619 0.914 0.683 0.735 
 (0.456) (0.649) (0.490) (0.524) 
District Variance 0.194 0.250 0.188 0.193 
 (0.098) (0.148) (0.094) (0.096) 
     
Observations 1,804 1,316 1,812 1,781 
Number of Groups 5 5 5 5 
Log Likelihood -1,000.376 -719.850 -1,009.657 -983.084 
Wald c2 32.40*** 37.18*** 28.71*** 28.54*** 
Table entries are coefficients from multilevel logistic regression models with country level and district level random effects; 
standard errors in parentheses. 
 




Table 4. Economic Conflict Multilevel Logistic Regression Models 









     
Sudden, Short-Term Events 0.033 -0.101 0.045 0.013 
 (0.167) (0.175) (0.166) (0.169) 
Gradual, Long-Term Events 0.482 0.386 0.476 0.491 
  (0.143)***  (0.163)**  (0.142)***  (0.144)*** 
Female 0.047 0.075 0.074 0.057 
 (0.116) (0.137) (0.115) (0.116) 
Age -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Household Member Migrated -0.157 -0.049 -0.150 -0.132 
 (0.115) (0.135)  (0.115) (0.116) 
No Education 0.252    
 (0.285)    
Primary Education 0.225    
 (0.206)    
Secondary Education -0.182    
  (0.139)    
Poor Household  0.420   
   (0.177)**   
Rich Household  -0.018   
   (0.217)    
Economic Reason   0.266  
    (0.146)*  
Civil Servant    0.004 
    (0.250) 
Business Sales    -0.135 
     (0.156) 
Craft and Trade Workers    -0.349 
    (0.252) 
Elementary Occupation    0.416 
     (0.192)** 
Other Sources of Income    -0.972 
     (0.502)* 
Constant -0.519 -0.650 -0.731 -0.475 
  (0.493)  (0.542)  (0.517)  (0.520) 
     
Country Variance 0.855 1.014 0.952 0.966 
 (0.591) (0.667) (0.645) (0.656) 
District Variance 0.125 0.026 0.130 0.132 
 (0.068) (0.059) (0.070) (0.071) 
     
Observations 1,804 1,316 1,812 1,781 
Number of Groups 5 5 5 5 
Log Likelihood -1,007.100 -728.280 -1,012.979 -993.773 
Wald c2 18.76** 13.65* 16.40** 26.79*** 
Table entries are coefficients from multilevel logistic regression models with country level and district level random effects; 
standard errors in parentheses. 
 




Table 5. Environmental Conflict Multilevel Logistic Regression Models 








     
Sudden, Short-Term Events -0.233 -0.269 -0.255 -0.239 
 (0.195) (0.206) (0.194) (0.200) 
Gradual, Long-Term Events 0.875 0.918 0.888 0.853 
  (0.216)***  (0.250)***  (0.215)***  (0.221)*** 
Female 0.166 0.112 0.174 0.221 
 (0.153) (0.172) (0.150) (0.154) 
Age 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Household Member Migrated 0.059 0.122 0.067 0.056 
 (0.152) (0.173)  (0.152) (0.155) 
No Education -0.029    
 (0.324)    
Primary Education -0.038    
 (0.284)    
Secondary Education -0.203    
  (0.215)    
Poor Household  0.789   
   (0.239)***   
Rich Household  -0.462   
   (0.352)    
Economic Reason   0.162  
    (0.194)  
Civil Servant    -0.132 
    (0.394) 
Business Sales    0.012 
     (0.200) 
Craft and Trade Workers    -0.284 
    (0.341) 
Elementary Occupation    -0.126 
     (0.262) 
Other Sources of Income    0.082 
     (0.650) 
Constant -2.357 -2.802 -2.534 -2.313 
  (0.452)***  (0.508)***  (0.457)***  (0.468)*** 
     
Country Variance 0.322 0.389 0.311 0.361 
 (0.347) (0.372) (0.326) (0.358) 
District Variance 0.562 0.492 0.553 0.551 
 (0.255) (0.258) (0.251) (0.251) 
     
Observations 1,804 1,316 1,812 1,781 
Number of Groups 5 5 5 5 
Log Likelihood -656.969 -509.258 -661.467 -993.773 
Wald c2 21.65*** 37.09*** 22.67*** 26.79*** 
Table entries are coefficients from multilevel logistic regression models with country level and district level random effects; 
standard errors in parentheses. 
 




Table 6. Political Conflict Multilevel Logistic Regression Models 








     
Sudden, Short-Term Events 0.402 0.500 0.433 0.489 
 (0.358) (0.363) (0.355) (0.361) 
Gradual, Long-Term Events 0.959 1.101 0.951 0.947 
  (0.463)**  (0.525)**  (0.465)**  (0.475)** 
Female -0.710 -0.670 -0.685 -0.718 
  (0.311)**  (0.316)**  (0.302)**  (0.303)** 
Age 0.013 0.015 0.015 0.015 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Household Member Migrated 0.077 -0.014 0.073 0.141 
 (0.310) (0.329)  (0.309) (0.311) 
No Education 0.378    
 (0.661)    
Primary Education 0.866    
 (0.596)    
Secondary Education 0.125    
  (0.568)    
Poor Household  0.583   
   (0.464)   
Rich Household  -0.597   
   (0.829)    
Economic Reason   0.182  
    (0.419)  
Civil Servant    0.537 
    (0.660) 
Business Sales    0.096 
     (0.422) 
Craft and Trade Workers    -1.090 
    (1.042) 
Elementary Occupation    0.319 
     (0.486) 
Other Sources of Income    0.406 
     (1.093) 
Constant -5.135 -5.397 -5.114 -5.073 
  (0.838)***  (0.927)***  (0.864)***  (0.865)*** 
     
Country Variance 0.688 0.874 0.906 1.063 
 (0.643) (0.863) (0.720) (0.815) 
District Variance 0.052 0.000 0.014 0.000 
 (0.139) (0.000) (0.101) (0.000) 
     
Observations 1,804 1,316 1,812 1,781 
Number of Groups 5 5 5 5 
Log Likelihood -193.592 -170.740 -195.779 -191.127 
Wald c2 14.67* 12.22* 11.45* 13.45 
Table entries are coefficients from multilevel logistic regression models with country level and district level random effects; 
standard errors in parentheses. 
 













































Figure 2. The Probability of Conflict Perception for Gradual, Long-term Events 
 
 
Graph shows predicted probabilities for the value of 1 for the five different dependent variables 
while Gradual, Long-Term Events=1; horizontal bars pertain to 95% confidence intervals; all 
other variables held constant at their means; calculations are based on Tables 2-6 where we 














The Determinants of Environmental Migrants’ Conflict Perception 
– Online Appendix 
In order to ensure the robustness of our results, we changed a variety of model specifications and 
re-run the estimations. In the following, we briefly discuss these changes and corresponding 
results that further support our theory and results of the main text.86 These include: 
• Appendix Table 1 re-estimates the core empirical models in the main text while including 
interactions of the environmental events variables with an item on political exclusion.  
• Appendix Table 2 summarizes models that are based on a more constrained sample of 
rather inclusive states only. 
• Appendix Table 3 focuses on individuals that only recently arrived at their new location 
of residence. 
• Appendix Table 4 focuses on a heckman-type probit selection model on the decision to 
migrate and conflict perceptions. 
• Appendix Table 5 omits all control covariates for the model estimation. 
• Appendix Table 6 additionally incorporates two country-level covariates. 
• Appendix Table 7 summarizes the main models while interacting the environmental events 
variables with political regime type. 
• Appendix Table 8 summarizes the main models while interacting the environmental events 
variables with GDP per capita. 
• Appendix Table 9 re-estimates the main models with logistic regression and country fixed 
effects. 
																																								 																				
86 We mostly present only re-estimations of Table 2 from the main text, i.e., the general conflict perception variable. 
The models based on the other dependent variables produce qualitatively the same results as those discussed here, 
and can be replicated with our replication materials. The data and replication instructions can be obtained from the 
authors on request. 
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The appendix concludes with an overview of the locations of the surveys, including maps 
(Figures A1-A5), and the questionnaire we used for our interviews. First, in the models 
presented above, we do not explicitly examine conditional effects capturing interactive 
relationships between the determinants of migration at different levels (micro, macro, and meso) 
as Hunter, Luna, and Norton describe these relationships as “additive.”87 We plan on 
investigating these conditional relationships more thoroughly in a subsequent project, although 
we conducted some preliminary analyses with an interaction of the environmental-event 
variables and an item on political exclusion. Specifically, Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch88 
report that the probability of conflict increases when a specific ethnic group is on average poorer 
than the country as a whole. In a related fashion, Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch89 focus 
on horizontal inequalities and ethnic groups, and find that in highly unequal societies both 
affluent and poor groups relative to the national average are more likely to engage in conflict. In 
light of these studies, it seems plausible that ethnicity affects conflict and, in the first place, 
conflict perceptions. We control for this possibility in two ways.  
On one hand, the country- and regional-level random intercepts capture these influences at the 
levels above the individual. This strategy is effective if all/most respondents do actually have the 
same ethnic background, which is largely given in our sample data, although some variation does 
exist in the countries as well. On the other hand, an alternative mechanism that leads to more 
conflictive perceptions could be that individuals are more conflict-prone and aggressive if there 
is an actor who is the “perpetrator of environmental degradation” – but the type of the 
environmental event may matter less.90 Hence, the theoretical mechanism behind conflict 
perceptions could simply be about “who is to blame.”  
																																								 																				
87 Hunter, Luna, and Norton 2015, 9. 
88 Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2014. 
89 Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011. 
90 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
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We decided to address this concern with data on ethnicity and ethnic exclusion. More 
specifically, our survey data include information on the ethnic group an individual belongs to.91 
We combined this information with the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data set,92 which 
identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to state power in every country 
since 1946. Eventually, we are able to code whether an individual belongs to an ethnic group that 
is politically included or one that is excluded, i.e., when it is politically powerless, when group 
members are subject to active and intentional discrimination by the state, or when a group 
excludes itself from power (“separatist autonomy”). When incorporating this additional variable 
into our models and interacting it with the environmental-events variables, we can capture the 
mechanism that the grievance toward some actor to blame (i.e., the included group or the state) 
might either be more relevant than or moderate the effect of the environmental-events items. We 
re-estimated all models with this additional variable and its interactive specification. The 
corresponding results, which we summarize for the general conflict-perception variable in Table 
A1, show that while the political-exclusion variable is insignificant, our main finding that 
gradual, long-term environmental changes positively and significantly affects migrants’ conflict 
perceptions does hold. Moreover, the multiplicative terms are largely insignificant. This lends 
little support to the claim that a conditional effect does exist. However, other interactive 
relationships may be given in our data set and we seek to address this in the future. 
__________ 
Table A1 here 
__________ 
Related to this, it might be possible that people move from a relatively “benign environment” 
to a more hostile one (or vice versa), and that this affects conflict perceptions in turn. Given the 
																																								 																				
91 Specifically, the exact survey question is: “which ethnic group do you belong to?”  
92 Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Vogt et al. 2015. 
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information that our survey offers and the data from the EPR,93 we obtained the variable “size of 
the excluded population in a country” from the EPR data (in the year 2012). After having 
determined the mean value of this item in our sample (0.172), we dropped those countries that 
had excluded populations above that average value. Ultimately, we thus constrain our data to a 
sample of countries, which are relatively inclusive throughout their societies, their sub-regions, 
districts, and towns. Hence, the degree of political inclusion in that constrained sample is fairly 
constant then, since we dropped those cases in which people could move from a more inclusive 
area to a more excluded one (or vice versa). Afterwards, we re-estimated our models with this 
constrained, but overall relatively inclusive sample of individuals and countries. The main result 
for Gradual, Long-Term Events should hold with this sample as well (i.e., a sample that then 
basically captures “same-level-of-inclusion” within-country migration). Again, as demonstrated 
in Table A2, our core result remains robust as the positive and statistically significant effect of 
gradual, long-term events is still given. 
__________ 
Table A2 here 
__________ 
Third, and coming back to the main text, we repeated our analysis focusing on migrants that 
arrived rather shortly to their new location. This allows us to rule out	a strong influence at the 
“new home” on conflict perceptions. To this end, we use a variable that measures how long a 
migrant has lived in his/her new location. We only include those migrants that are part of the 
lower 10 percent of that variables’ distribution (274 migrants; average duration spent in new 
location=0.986 years). The results (Table A3) show that Gradual, Long-Term Events remains to 
be positively signed and statistically significant, which increases the confidence in the validity of 
our findings and argument.  
																																								 																				




Table A3 here 
__________ 
Fourth, migrants are not a random sample of individuals. In the models above, we partly 
control for this circumstance with the Economic Reason item and other controls that may well 
have affected an individuals’ decision to migrate in the first place. However, the reasons to 
migrate may be more multi-faceted and there could also be unobserved determinants affecting an 
individual’s decision to stay or move. If these variables related the migration decision also affect 
a migrant’s perception of conflict, we may either over- or underestimate the effect of our core 
explanatory variables. In order to address this issue thoroughly, we created a data set comprising 
both migrants and non-migrants (i.e., individuals who decided to stay in the migrant’s previous 
location). Afterwards, we relied on a Heckman-type selection model for binary data (Heckman 
Probit Model), for which we had to specify a selection variable and a binary outcome.  
The binary outcome variable is one of those dependent variables used for the core models 
above, while we rely on a binary migration variable (1=migrated; 0=not migrated) to capture 
sample selection. As Heckman-type models require that there must be at least one variable in the 
selection equation that does not appear in the outcome equation, we only include our core 
variables of interest (Sudden, Short-Term Events and Gradual, Long-Term Events) as well as any 
of the statistically significant controls from the main text’s Tables 2-6 in the outcome equation. 
For example, Female does not exert a statistically significant impact in Table 2, but in Models 5-
8 (Table 3 in the main text). Hence, for the selection models based on Table 2, we only include 
Female in the selection equation, while this item is included in both the selection and outcome 
equation of those selection models that are based on the main article’s Table 3. Eventually, this 
ensures that the model is identified. That said, when estimating these selection models, our core 
results are not affected by this change in the estimation strategy; moreover, the coefficient 
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capturing the correlation in the two equations’ error terms is mainly insignificant across 
estimations, suggesting that sample selection is of minor importance in our context. 
__________ 
Table A4 here 
__________ 
Fifth, one major concern could be that the environmental-events estimates are affected by the 
inclusion or exclusion of potentially endogenous factors. In fact, Clarke shows that including 
control variables in models can actually increase the bias.94 However, when omitting all control 
covariates in our models and only including the environmental-events items as explanatory 
variables, the effect of gradual, long-term and sudden, short-term events, respectively, does 
virtually not change across the regressions (Table A5). We are therefore confident that the effect 
of gradual, long-term events is indeed unbiased. 
__________ 
Table A5 here 
__________ 
Sixth, by incorporating country-level and regional-level random intercepts, we control for the 
fact that we study internal migration in five country contexts as well as in diverse regional 
settings. However, one could model these different contexts more directly by including relevant 
factors that might affect migration patterns within countries. Two factors seem most relevant 
from this perspective: a nation’s political system and a country’s economic development. Both 
influences could affect a country’s capability to react to specific environmental events and, thus, 
migrants’ conflict perceptions. We thus considered a variable on a country’s political system, 
measured by the polity2 variable from the Polity IV data,95 and GDP per capita in current US 
Dollars as taken from the World Bank Development Indicators. For both items, we use data from 
																																								 																				
94 Clarke 2005, 2009. 
95 Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2013. 
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2012 to ensure that they are measured before the surveys were conducted. When incorporating 
these country-level controls, the results show that basically none of them has a significant effect 
either for the aggregated or the disaggregated dependent variables (Table A6). Finally, we also 
examined the possibility of interactive effects, mirroring the rationale behind Table A1 to some 
extent. As demonstrated in Tables A7-A8, however, this does also not question our main finding. 
Finally, it has been suggested to re-estimate our main models with “regular” logistic 
regression and country fixed effects. Such an approach could indicate where we see a stronger 
link at a country level, and this might be more accurately than the multi-level setup in the main 
text that merely controls for country-level variance and the robustness check above that 
incorporates country-level covariates (democracy and income). Table A9 summarizes our 
findings for this last robustness check (based on Model 1 of the main text; the findings are 
qualitatively the same for all other models). Furthermore, while logistic regression models with 
country dummies are inconsistent if the number of observations per country is not large enough, 
the results are identical if we employ a conditional logistic regression instead. 
__________ 
Table A9 here 
__________ 
On one hand, the main conclusion of our research pertaining to gradual, long-term 
environmental events is unchanged. On the other hand, all fixed effects are positively signed and 
statistically significant, and this result in Table A9 is representative of all other models discussed 
above when including fixed effects there. This emphasizes that these countries differ from the 
baseline, i.e., Nicaragua, in important ways. It may thus be an effort worth making in future 
research to focus on that country as the likelihood of conflict perceptions seems to be 




Table A1. General Conflict Perception Multilevel Logistic Regression Models 
 












     
Sudden, Short-Term Events 0.236 0.186 0.219 0.213 
 (0.183) (0.205) (0.183) (0.184) 
Gradual, Long-Term Events 0.434 0.319 0.450 0.451 
  (0.146)***  (0.178)*  (0.146)***  (0.147)*** 
Political Exclusion 0.671 0.844 0.714 0.682 
 (0.651) (0.666) (0.650) (0.655) 
Sudden, Short-Term Events * Political Exclusion -1.000 -1.226 -1.042 -1.025 
 (0.692) (0.731)* (0.693) (0.695) 
Gradual, Long-Term Events * Political Exclusion -0.263 -0.552 -0.192 -0.190 
 (0.680) (0.825) (0.684) (0.684) 
Female 0.034 0.019 0.008 -0.005 
 (0.118) (0.147) (0.117) (0.117) 
Age -0.002 -0.004 -0.009 -0.008 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Household Member Migrated -0.214 -0.152 -0.203 -0.192 
 (0.117)* (0.143) (0.116)* (0.117)* 
No Education -0.659    
 (0.419)    
Primary Education -0.375    
 (0.212)*    
Secondary Education -0.319    
  (0.131)**    
Poor Household  0.194   
   (0.197)   
Rich Household  -0.113   
   (0.224)    
Economic Reason   0.123  
    (0.147)  
Civil Servant    0.144 
    (0.239) 
Business Sales    0.005 
     (0.158) 
Craft and Trade Workers    -0.208 
    (0.239) 
Elementary Occupation    0.147 
    (0.199) 
Other Sources of Income    -0.287 
     (0.364) 
Constant -0.297 -0.439 -0.380 -0.295 
 (0.315) (0.378) (0.333) (0.331) 
     
Country Variance 0.057 0.136 0.089 0.086 
 (0.083) (0.142) (0.105) (0.105) 
District Variance 0.177 0.115 0.178 0.182 
 (0.082) (0.076) (0.082) (0.084) 
Observations 1,440 949 1,441 1,441 
Number of Groups 4 4 4 4 
Log Likelihood -929.041 -625.565 -932.749 -931.719 
Wald c2 23.58** 9.10 17.09** 19.01 
Table entries are coefficients from multilevel logistic regression models with country level and district level random 
effects; standard errors in parentheses. 
 




Table A2. General Conflict Perception – Constrained Sample (More Inclusive States) 
 












     
Sudden, Short-Term Events 0.147 -0.038 0.097 0.088 
 (0.211) (0.244) (0.211) (0.211) 
Gradual, Long-Term Events 0.533 0.431 0.553 0.555 
  (0.153)***  (0.189)**  (0.152)***  (0.152)*** 
Female 0.039 0.027 0.003 -0.002 
 (0.129) (0.172) (0.128) (0.129) 
Age -0.004 -0.007 -0.013 -0.013 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)* (0.008)* 
Household Member Migrated -0.272 -0.214 -0.254 -0.250 
 (0.130)** (0.168) (0.129)** (0.130)* 
No Education -0.826    
 (0.452)*    
Primary Education -0.666    
 (0.247)***    
Secondary Education -0.444    
  (0.148)***    
Poor Household  0.414   
   (0.261)   
Rich Household  -0.149   
   (0.233)    
Economic Reason   -0.027  
    (0.177)  
Civil Servant    0.085 
    (0.264) 
Business Sales    0.037 
     (0.177) 
Craft and Trade Workers    -0.129 
    (0.269) 
Elementary Occupation    0.177 
    (0.232) 
Other Sources of Income    0.221 
     (0.450) 
Constant -0.211 -0.323 -0.178 -0.216 
 (0.358) (0.524) (0.404) (0.398) 
     
Country Variance 0.041 0.335 0.110 0.118 
 (0.079) (0.332) (0.137) (0.147) 
District Variance 0.176 0.082 0.182 0.191 
 (0.089) (0.078) (0.092) (0.096) 
Observations 1,190 699 1,191 1,191 
Number of Groups 3 3 3 3 
Log Likelihood -747.671 -447.057 -754.313 -753.680 
Wald c2 31.22*** 11.32 19.54*** 20.72** 
Table entries are coefficients from multilevel logistic regression models with country level and district level random effects; 
standard errors in parentheses. 
 





Table A3. General Conflict Perception – Constrained Sample (More “Recent” Migrants) 
 












     
Sudden, Short-Term Events -0.689 -0.841 -0.663 -0.619 
 (0.372) (0.434)* (0.395)* (0.422) 
Gradual, Long-Term Events 0.765 0.760 0.847 0.786 
  (0.347)**  (0.427)*  (0.367)**  (0.376)** 
Female 0.017 -0.025 0.006 0.129 
 (0.316) (0.382) (0.316) (0.321) 
Age 0.013 0.024 0.017 0.010 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) 
Household Member Migrated -0.202 -0.635 -0.178 -0.341 
 (0.313) (0.408) (0.313) (0.324) 
No Education 0.185    
 (0.627)    
Primary Education -0.290    
 (0.514)    
Secondary Education -0.810    
  (0.364)**    
Poor Household  -0.612   
   (0.454)   
Rich Household  -0.458   
   (0.803)    
Economic Reason   -0.556  
    (0.350)  
Civil Servant    0.335 
    (0.639) 
Business Sales    0.389 
     (0.450) 
Craft and Trade Workers    0.757 
    (0.614) 
Elementary Occupation    0.676 
    (0.469) 
Other Sources of Income    0.146 
     (0.798) 
Constant -0.106 -0.056 -0.152 -0.544 
 (0.687) (0.836) (0.739) (0.763) 
     
Country Variance 0.001 0.001 0.270 0.553 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.431) (0.654) 
District Variance 0.554 1.196 0.477 0.458 
 (0.332) (0.681) (0.402) (0.402) 
     
Observations 266 202 267 263 
Number of Groups 5 5 5 5 
Log Likelihood -152.643 -113.793 -154.548 -150.744 
Wald c2 19.49** 12.46* 11.59* 11.03 
Table entries are coefficients from multilevel logistic regression models with country level and district level random 
effects; standard errors in parentheses. 
 





Table A4. General Conflict Perception – Heckman-Probit Models 
 












     
Sudden, Short-Term Events -0.212 -0.182 -0.268 -0.259 
 (0.188) (0.161) (0.255) (0.259) 
Gradual, Long-Term Events 0.532 0.659 0.598 0.601 
  (0.213)**  (0.281)**  (0.252)**  (0.266)** 
Secondary Education -0.311    
 (0.150)*    
Poor Household  0.179   
  (0.281)   
Constant -0.014 -0.126 -0.003 0.007 
 (0.131) (0.164) (0.258) (0.251) 
Selection Equation (Migrant – 1/0)     
Sudden, Short-Term Events 0.035 -0.100 0.001 0.108 
 (0.303) (0.212) (0.181) (0.245) 
Gradual, Long-Term Events -0.239 -0.150 -0.365 -0.311 
  (0.103)**  (0.138)  (0.037)***  (0.060)*** 
Female 0.082 0.106 0.144 0.035 
 (0.154) (0.145) (0.160) (0.154) 
Age -0.036 -0.037 -0.037 -0.045 
 (0.010)*** (0.012)*** (0.013)*** (0.015)*** 
Household Member Migrated 0.100 0.107 0.033 0.128 
 (0.140) (0.157) (0.117) (0.148) 
No Education -0.743    
 (0.383)*    
Primary Education -1.093    
 (0.407)***    
Secondary Education -0.892    
  (0.280)***    
Poor Household  -0.131   
   (0.160)   
Rich Household  0.281   
   (0.372)    
Economic Reason   1.866  
    (0.436)***  
Civil Servant    -0.229 
    (0.145) 
Business Sales    -0.304 
     (0.043)*** 
Craft and Trade Workers    -0.632 
    (0.156)*** 
Elementary Occupation    -0.391 
    (0.156)** 
Other Sources of Income    -0.231 
     (0.137)* 
Constant 1.961 1.182 0.519 1.724 
 (0.621)*** (0.449)*** (0.463) (0.512)*** 
     
Observations 3,613 3,124 3,624 3,476 
Log Likelihood -3,237.061 -2,782.845 -2,684.508 -3,238.877 
Rho 0.095 -0.064 -0.083 -0.101 
 
Table entries are coefficients from heckman-probit regression models with; standard errors clustered on country in 
parentheses. 
 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
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Table A5. General Conflict Perception Multilevel Logistic Regression Models 
 




Sudden, Short-Term Events 0.120 
 (0.159) 
Gradual, Long-Term Events 0.503 





Country Variance 0.776 
 (0.544) 




Number of Groups 5 
Log Likelihood -1,089.604 
Wald c2 13.55*** 
 
Table entries are coefficients from multilevel logistic regression models with country level and district level random 
effects; standard errors in parentheses. 
 













Table A6. General Conflict Perception Multilevel Logistic Regression Models – Country-Level 
Covariates 












     
Sudden, Short-Term Events 0.117 0.051 0.118 0.085 
 (0.161) (0.173) (0.160) (0.162) 
Gradual, Long-Term Events 0.493 0.393 0.496 0.502 
  (0.139)***  (0.165)**  (0.138)***  (0.139)*** 
Polity (Democracy) -0.030 -0.073 -0.032 -0.033 
 (0.077) (0.070) (0.076) (0.077) 
GDP per capita -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female 0.094 0.113 0.090 0.094 
 (0.111) (0.135) (0.110) (0.111) 
Age -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 -0.009 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Household Member Migrated -0.147 -0.039 -0.129 -0.132 
 (0.110) (0.133) (0.110) (0.111) 
No Education -0.165    
 (0.292)    
Primary Education -0.264    
 (0.199)    
Secondary Education -0.262    
  (0.130)**    
Poor Household  0.581   
   (0.180)***   
Rich Household  -0.194   
   (0.213)    
Economic Reason   0.027  
    (0.139)  
Civil Servant    0.096 
    (0.233) 
Business Sales    -0.040 
     (0.150) 
Craft and Trade Workers    -0.179 
    (0.228) 
Elementary Occupation    0.171 
    (0.185) 
Other Sources of Income    -0.193 
     (0.355) 
Constant 0.265 -0.001 0.195 0.280 
 (0.638) (0.603) (0.636) (0.638) 
     
Country Variance 0.712 0.575 0.696 0.710 
 (0.516) (0.410) (0.492) (0.504) 
District Variance 0.188 0.146 0.188 0.193 
 (0.083) (0.085) (0.083) (0.085) 
Observations 1,804 1,316 1,812 1,781 
Number of Groups 5 5 5 5 
Log Likelihood -1,069.344 -762.116 -1,076.511 -1,061.226 
Wald c2 20.96** 21.84*** 16.97** 20.13* 
Table entries are coefficients from multilevel logistic regression models with country level and district level random 
effects; standard errors in parentheses. 
 




Table A7. General Conflict Perception Multilevel Logistic Regression Models – Interaction with 
Polity 












     
Sudden, Short-Term Events 0.028 -0.087 0.031 -0.020 
 (0.200) (0.262) (0.199) (0.202) 
Gradual, Long-Term Events 0.535 0.483 0.538 0.545 
  (0.141)***  (0.193)**  (0.140)***  (0.142)*** 
Polity (Democracy) -0.042 -0.088 -0.042 -0.046 
 (0.065) (0.063) (0.065) (0.065) 
Sudden Events * Polity 0.013 0.021 0.012 0.016 
 (0.028) (0.035) (0.027) (0.028) 
Gradual Events * Polity -0.032 -0.023 -0.034 -0.034 
 (0.021) (0.028) (0.021) (0.021) 
Female 0.089 0.111 0.085 0.089 
 (0.112) (0.135) (0.110) (0.111) 
Age -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 -0.009 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Household Member Migrated -0.151 -0.036 -0.134 -0.135 
 (0.111) (0.133) (0.110) (0.112) 
No Education -0.153    
 (0.292)    
Primary Education -0.248    
 (0.199)    
Secondary Education -0.253    
  (0.130)*    
Poor Household  0.576   
   (0.181)***   
Rich Household  -0.198   
   (0.214)    
Economic Reason   0.043  
    (0.139)  
Civil Servant    0.059 
    (0.234) 
Business Sales    -0.054 
     (0.151) 
Craft and Trade Workers    -0.196 
    (0.228) 
Elementary Occupation    0.158 
    (0.185) 
Other Sources of Income    -0.208 
     (0.355) 
Constant 0.217 0.001 0.142 0.262 
 (0.476) (0.486) (0.478) (0.477) 
     
Country Variance 0.631 0.485 0.619 0.619 
 (0.473) (0.366) (0.451) (0.455) 
District Variance 0.198 0.154 0.198 0.203 
 (0.086) (0.089) (0.086) (0.088) 
Observations 1,804 1,316 1,812 1,781 
Number of Groups 5 5 5 5 
Log Likelihood -1,067.967 -761.540 -1,075.031 -1,059.665 
Wald c2 23.63** 23.09** 19.92** 23.24** 
 
Table entries are coefficients from multilevel logistic regression models with country level and district level random 
effects; standard errors in parentheses. 
 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
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Table A8. General Conflict Perception Multilevel Logistic Regression Models – Interaction with GDP 
per capita 












     
Sudden, Short-Term Events 0.031 -0.041 0.034 -0.031 
 (0.251) (0.271) (0.250) (0.253) 
Gradual, Long-Term Events 0.745 0.765 0.750 0.766 
  (0.219)***  (0.247)***  (0.217)***  (0.221)*** 
GDP per capita -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Sudden Events * GDP per capita 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Gradual Events * GDP per capita -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.000)* (0.001) (0.001) 
Female 0.095 0.118 0.090 0.093 
 (0.111) (0.135) (0.110) (0.111) 
Age -0.003 -0.004 -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Household Member Migrated -0.137 -0.018 -0.119 -0.122 
 (0.111) (0.133) (0.110) (0.112) 
No Education -0.167    
 (0.292)    
Primary Education -0.257    
 (0.198)    
Secondary Education -0.250    
  (0.130)*    
Poor Household  0.577   
   (0.178)***   
Rich Household  -0.204   
   (0.213)    
Economic Reason   0.029  
    (0.139)  
Civil Servant    0.080 
    (0.233) 
Business Sales    -0.042 
     (0.150) 
Craft and Trade Workers    -0.191 
    (0.227) 
Elementary Occupation    0.160 
    (0.186) 
Other Sources of Income    -0.229 
     (0.357) 
Constant 0.241 -0.033 0.172 0.281 
 (0.627) (0.637) (0.626) (0.624) 
     
Country Variance 0.645 0.614 0.631 0.632 
 (0.474) (0.431) (0.452) (0.456) 
District Variance 0.177 0.120 0.175 0.179 
 (0.079) (0.077) (0.078) (0.080) 
Observations 1,804 1,316 1,812 1,781 
Number of Groups 5 5 5 5 
Log Likelihood -1,068.122 -760.359 -1,075.251 -1,059.813 
Wald c2 23.49** 25.45*** 19.61** 23.06** 
Table entries are coefficients from multilevel logistic regression models with country level and district level random 
effects; standard errors in parentheses. 
 




Table A9. General Conflict Perception Logistic Regression Models with Country Fixed Effects 
 
 Model 25 
(Conflict Perception) 
  
Sudden, Short-Term Events 0.205 
 (0.157) 
Gradual, Long-Term Events 0.286 





Household Member Migrated -0.184 
 (0.106)* 
No Education -0.277 
 (0.287) 
Primary Education -0.288 
 (0.191) 
Secondary Education -0.244 
  (0.125)* 
Peru 0.833 
  (0.182)*** 
Uganda 3.081 
  (0.301)*** 
Cambodia 1.024 
  (0.199)*** 
Vietnam 0.467 




Log Likelihood -1,077.070 
Likelihood Ratio c2 346.42*** 
Table entries are coefficients from logistic regression models with country fixed effects (Nicaragua as 
baseline); standard errors in parentheses. 
 









Table A10. Overview of Surveys 
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Anocracy 
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Anocracy 
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Figure A1. Nicaragua with Locations of Interviews 
 
Graph shows map of Nicaragua. Blue circles pertain to non-migrants, while purple diamonds 
stand for interview locations of migrants. 
 
Figure A2. Peru with Locations of Interviews 
 
Graph shows map of Peru. Blue circles pertain to non-migrants, while purple diamonds stand for 
interview locations of migrants. 
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Figure A3. Cambodia with Locations of Interviews 
 
Graph shows map of Cambodia. Blue circles pertain to non-migrants, while purple diamonds 
stand for interview locations of migrants. 
 
Figure A4. Uganda with Locations of Interviews 
Graph shows map of Uganda. Blue circles pertain to non-migrants, while purple diamonds stand 









Graphs show map of Vietnam (upper panel: North; lower panel: South). Blue circles pertain to 






Interview ID _____ --______--______     
Date: ____/____/_____ 
Interviewer ID _____________________ 
 






Current Weather [observed]: 




Respondent: [based on observation] 
Household Status [scale determined before start of interview]   
1. Very poor  
2. Poor 
3. Average 
4. Above average 
5. Wealthy 
99. N/A [Circle if interview not conducted in respondent home] 
 
Sex of Respondent 
1. Female 2. Male 
 
Interview Schedule  
How long have you lived in this location?  
1. Since birth  
2. ____________ [years] 
99. Don’t Know/Refused to Answer  
 
Where did you come from? 
Commune/Village: ___________________ District_________________ Province___________ 
 
Were you born there?  
1. Yes  
2. No 
99. Don’t Know/Refused to Answer 
 
How long were you in that previous location for?   _______________ years  
99. Don’t Know/Refused to Answer  
 
What is the highest level of formal education you have attended? 
[Ask for specific number of years completed] 
1. No formal education 
2. Primary school _________ Years completed  
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3. Secondary_________ Years completed 
4. Technical ________________Years completed 
5. Post-Secondary ___________ Years completed 
6. Other ________________ 
99. Don’t know/Refused to Answer 
 
 
Could you tell us your age? ___________  
[If does not know or refuses to respond, interviewer to guess] 
 
 
Which ethnic group do you belong to? ________________  
 99. Don’t know/Refused to Answer 
 
 
I will read you a list of sources of income. Could you tell us which are your (household) main 
source(s) of income? (Non-migrant) - I will read you a list of sources of income. Could you tell us 
which were your (household) main source(s) of income in your former location? (Migrant) 
(Circle all mentioned. If more than one was mentioned, ask to rank them in order of importance 
(from 1-5, 1 the most important) (Insert number in spaces provided in question BELOW)  
 
1. __________________ Agriculture/Farm /animal /fishing income 
2.__________________ Proceeds as shop/business owner 
3.__________________ Proceeds markets sales (non-farm) 
4.__________________ Civil servant salary 
5.__________________ Salary from industry (firm, factory, corporation) 
6.__________________ Salary from labor (handicrafts, construction) 
7.__________________ Day Labor-Temporary 




99._________________ Don’t Know /Refused to Answer 
 
 
From your perspective, can you describe the main weather event(s) that have happened here during 
the last 5 years? (Non-migrant) – From your perspective, can you describe the main weather 
event(s) that occurred during the past five years before you left your previous residence? (Migrant) 
[If respondent is unable to answer freely, read the list. For each reported event follow up with 
questions in the following table]. [Circle all that apply] Show Card 
1. Heavy Rains/Floods [please circle] 
2. Salinity 
3. Snow/Hail [please circle] 
4. Drought/Desertification [please circle] 
5. Storm/Cyclone/Typhoon [please circle] 
6. Landslide/Mudslide/Avalanche [please circle] 
7. Other______________________________ 
8. None 






Have you ever thought about migrating? If yes, then ask: What was/were the reason(s)? (Non-
migrant) - I would like to ask you all the reason(s) why you decided to move from your former 
location. (Migrant) 
[Allow respondents to answer without reading list and circle all responses in “Unprompted 
Column”. Then follow up by reading list/Show Card. Additional responses should be circled in 
“Prompted Column”]  
Social reasons: for example, Marriage; There are family/relatives in the new location; I was facing 
discrimination; There was insecurity (physical &/or sexual); To seek health care (inadequate 
health care in area); To seek schooling (e.g. no school in area); Other 
Economic reasons: for example, Not enough income from livelihood sources; Unreliable harvest;  
No land available for farming/agriculture; Crop failure; Unemployment in that location; Job 
opportunity in new place; Higher income in new place; Other 
Environmental reasons: for example, Water shortage/Drought [1 event]; Repeated droughts /Long 
Term salinity; Too much water; Short term events such as flood, storm, landslide, cyclone: 
Single event or Repeated Event; Other 
Political reasons: for example, There was conflict; To seek political freedom; Government 
provided incentives for me to go; Government forced me to move; Other 
 
 Of all the reasons you mentioned, could you please rank the top three most important factors? 
[Write number of code from above reason in first, second and third place below, with number 1 as 





















 [For short 
term events]  















































































































Up until now, have members of your household left temporarily or permanently for other 
places or even abroad? (Non-migrant) -Up until now, have other members of your household 
in your previous location left temporarily or permanently for other places, or even abroad? 
[Excluding respondent](Migrant) 
1. Yes  
2. No 
 99. Don’t Know/Refused to Answer 
 
 
Do you know of anyone who left after having experienced the same event(s) 
(drought/desertification/flood/cyclone/etc)? [Not from the same HH] (Non-migrant) - Do you 
know anyone else who left from your previous location around the same time you did? [Other 
than you] (Migrant) 
1. Yes 
2. No 
99. Don’t Know/Refused to Answer  
 





Would you be willing to provide us with the name and contact information for these people so 
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